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THE COMPARATIVE OUTPUTS OF
MAGISTRATE JUDGES
Christina L. Boyd*
Do federal magistrate judges make different decisions and produce distinct
judicial outputs from district judges? To provide initial empirical evidence on this
question, this study utilizes federal district court data covering issue areas including employment discrimination, broader civil rights, intellectual-property rights,
and personal-injury torts. The data indicate that magistrate judges are actively
involved in civil cases, with as many as sixty-seven percent of cases having one or
more magistrate judges serving in some role. These magistrate judges commonly
preside over settlement conferences, decide discovery motions, issue reports and
recommendations on dispositive motions, preside over status, management, and
scheduling conferences, and serve as the assigned judge in the case by the consent of the parties. While there are numerous areas where there is no statistical
difference in the outputs of magistrate judges and district judges, notable differences include grant rates of discovery motions, the likelihood of cases settling,
appeal rates, the number of days to case resolution, the number of docket entries
before case resolution, and the likelihood of opinion publication. The results may
be due to differences in behavior between district judges and magistrate judges
or, instead, may be driven by non-random opinion assignment practices.
This project also provides empirical insight into two additional, closely related questions. For the first question of whether prior experience as a magistrate
judge affects district judge behavior, the data reveal that differences in settlement
probabilities again emerge. The data also show a lower rate of report and recommendation non-adoption, and a higher number of words and citations per
opinion among district judges with magistrate judge experience than those without that same background. For the second question of whether magistrate judges
who receive future Article III district court appointments behave differently from
their magistrate colleagues who do not, the data indicate that future district judges have higher grant rates on discovery motions and lower rates of appeal than
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other magistrate judges. There are also no instances in the data of these future
appointees having their reports and recommendations not adopted. The article
ends with an encouragement of additional data collection efforts on magistrate
judges’ decisions and activities to further the systematic inquiry into this important subject.
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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, as amended and codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 631–639, details the important role of magistrate judges (MJs) in the
U.S. district courts today. For purposes of this article, 28 U.S.C. § 636 is particularly instructive, describing the jurisdiction and powers of these judges in
civil cases.1 Three areas of MJ civil jurisdiction and power are of note: (1)
hearing and determining various pretrial matters,2 (2) conducting hearings and
submitting to the district judge findings of fact and recommendations for the

1

28 U.S.C. § 636 (2012) also details MJ powers and jurisdiction in criminal cases, a subject
that is beyond the scope of this Article’s inquiry.
2 Id. § 636(b)(1)(A). This subsection clarifies that a District Judge may not designate MJs to
“hear and determine” the following matters:
[A] motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or information made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a
criminal case, to dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an action.

Id.
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ultimate disposition,3 and (3) upon the consent of the parties, conducting any or
all proceedings in a case and ordering its entry of judgment.4
This article seeks to provide an initial empirical overview of the outputs
and activities of MJs serving in these three important roles in civil federal district court cases. To do so, this project utilizes a wide range of data to investigate how often MJs participate in civil cases, what activities they engage in,
what decisions they make, and how their presence in a case as the consent
judge (via point (3) above) or as a pretrial participant (via points (1) and (2)
above) affects the case’s outcome and outputs, if at all. Throughout this piece,
the behavior and outputs of MJs are compared to those of the Article III district
judges (DJs) with whom they serve alongside. This comparison between the
outputs of MJs and DJs permits the examination of the question at the heart of
this article: Do MJs produce distinct judicial outputs from DJs?
While the other articles of this Symposium issue more fully weigh in on
why we should or should not expect differences between MJ and DJ outputs, a
few points are worthy of note here. When it comes to rationale for why we
might expect a difference in the outputs of MJs and DJs, one potential explanation includes the varying status and job protection of the judges. DJs are Article
III appointees, nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and
holders of life tenure.5 MJs are not.6 Instead, they are selected by their district
court colleagues for renewable eight-year terms and may be fired, sanctioned,
or not chosen for reappointment.7 Without the same codified independence and
job protection that DJs enjoy, MJs may behave differently. Additionally, the
role of MJs, in theory, is not identical to DJs. As 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) indicates, a great deal of a MJ’s focus is on pretrial matters.8 With this, it is possible that MJs develop a distinct set of skills and strengths during the course of
their service, and that translates to different behavior.
On the flip side, however, the lack of Article III protection may serve as
encouragement for MJs to attempt to behave exactly like DJs or at least in ways
that should please DJs. Additionally, scholars examining trial court judging often conclude that there is little room for judicial discretion to operate in most
decisions that are made.9 This means that the parties, the types of cases, the
facts of the cases, and the settled law as applied to those facts, are generally
much better predictors of decisions and outputs than the identity of the judge or
3

Id. § 636(b)(1)(B). This subsection indicates that MJ “proposed findings of fact and recommendations” may be designated the task of conducting hearings, proposing findings of
fact, and recommending a disposition on matters for all motions listed in subsection (A). Id.
4 Id. § 636(c)(1).
5 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
6 See 28 U.S.C. § 631(e) (2012).
7 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, THE SELECTION, APPOINTMENT, AND
REAPPOINTMENT OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGES 2 (2010).
8 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
9 See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (2007).
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external constraints.10 While this research area is by no means settled, these
conclusions would seem to indicate that we may have little reason to expect
differences in outputs between DJs and MJs.
This article also provides the opportunity to empirically examine two additional questions that are closely related to the decision making of MJs. First,
does experience as a former MJ affect DJ behavior? Ultimately, if MJs develop
a unique set of skills and strengths while serving in that role, it is likely that
these things will translate into a different type of DJ than one entering the district court with other background experiences. Much of the expectations for
what effect, if any, we should expect from previous MJ experience on DJ behavior are likely to depend on what this paper reveals regarding the MJ versus
DJ question noted above. Second, do MJs alter their outputs to seek promotion
via nomination and confirmation to an Article III district court judgeship? Here,
the expectation is that some, but not all, MJs use their MJ role to “audition” for
a DJ position. If this is indeed the case, we should expect to observe decisionmaking and output differences among these two types of MJs.
This article proceeds in six parts. Part I provides background on the two
data sets used for this empirical examination and details the data exploration
technique used for this preliminary endeavor. Part II then gives an empirical
description of the participation of MJs in the two data sets. Part III provides an
in-depth examination of the comparative outputs of DJs and MJs throughout
the cases in the EEOC and Boyd data sets. Part IV conducts a similar exercise
for examining whether DJs with and without MJ experience behave differently,
and Part V does the same, in an abbreviated fashion, for MJs who do and do not
receive future DJ appointments. Finally, Part VI summarizes the results from
the project and reminds the readers of the numerous limitations within the empirical analyses.
I.

THE DATA AND ANALYSIS

To provide empirical insight into the comparative outputs of MJs, this project uses two recently collected federal district court, civil law data sources: the
EEOC litigation data and the Boyd data.
A. EEOC Litigation Data
The first source of data used in this project is the EEOC litigation data
(EEOC data).11 Collected, managed, and maintained by Pauline Kim, Margo
10

See generally, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of
Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1995); Denise M. Keele et
al., An Analysis of Ideological Effects in Published Versus Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 6
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 213 (2009); Thomas G. Walker, A Note Concerning Partisan Influences on Trial-Judge Decision Making, 6 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 645 (1972); Christopher
Zorn & Jennifer Barnes Bowie, Ideological Influences on Decision Making in the Federal
Judicial Hierarchy: An Empirical Assessment, 72 J. POL. 1212 (2010).
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Schlanger, and Andrew Martin, the EEOC data provide a vast quantitative and
qualitative data set of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission-brought
employment discrimination lawsuits filed between 1997 and 2006 in federal
trial courts.12 The data include a sample of 2,227 cases filed over this ten-year
period within ninety-two of the ninety-four federal district courts.13 These data
were first publicly released in 2012.14
The EEOC data provide a detailed picture of federal district court litigation. Rather than simply focusing on final case outcomes like most courtrelated data collection efforts, the EEOC data were designed to systematically
capture the different stages, participants, and activities within litigation. As a
result, in addition to traditional case outcome and timing variables, these data
include a record of nearly every motion (by type), scheduling, status, management, and settlement conference, ADR referral, parties’ consent to trial before a
magistrate, assignment of a new judge, and scheduling and postponement of a
trial date, among many other activities. The data also include extensive details
on the case participants (defendants, complainants, and all attorneys), the allegations made in the complaint, and the relief received by the plaintiff, if any.15
For purposes of this project, the fine-grained nature of these data is ideal, particularly because each of the above-noted events and motions is attached to the
presiding judge—including when that judge is an MJ who has not been formally assigned the case.
The EEOC data are uniquely suited to the MJ activity analysis conducted
below, but the nature of the data also present limitations that are important to
acknowledge and consider. As noted above, all of the cases in the EEOC data
are brought by the EEOC and are related to employment discrimination.16 The
EEOC is, of course, an atypical plaintiff, and its decision to file a lawsuit is far
from random.
The EEOC has statutory authority through the 1972 Equal Employment
Opportunity Act to sue private employers to enforce legislation banning em11

See EEOC LITIG. PROJECT, http://eeoclitigation.wustl.edu [https://perma.cc/V2HK-X9ZS]
(last updated July 3, 2013) (follow “Data Codebook” and “Master” hyperlinks).
12 See id. The most common statutory basis for these lawsuits is Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 as amended through the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)). Id.
13 For ease of analysis and discussion, this current project does not examine the seventyeight consolidated case observations in the EEOC litigation data and the eleven additional
complex litigation cases in which only the injunctive relief was coded. This exclusion brings
the total data number of case-level observations down from 2316 to 2227. The two district
courts with no cases represented in the EEOC data sample are the District of the Virgin Islands and the District of Maine. See id.
14 See id.
15 See id. This level of coding better permits an examination of district court cases. See generally Pauline T. Kim et al., How Should We Study District Judge Decision-Making?, 29 J.L.
& POL’Y 83 (2009).
16 The 2227 cases in the data include eight cases in which the EEOC intervened in a private
plaintiff’s employment lawsuit. See EEOC LITIG. PROJECT, supra note 11.
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ployment discrimination on the basis of sex, race, religion, and national
origin.17 Prior to bringing federal lawsuits to enforce these statutes, the EEOC
conducts extensive internal review of the employment discrimination complaints that it receives.18 Based on this review, the EEOC decides to file a federal district court lawsuit in some cases and declines to do so in others, a filtering process that the agency says is driven by “the seriousness of the violation,
the type of legal issues in the case, and the wider impact the lawsuit could have
on EEOC efforts to combat workplace discrimination.”19 For most complaints,
the EEOC chooses to not file a federal lawsuit.20 For example, in the 2001 fiscal year, the EEOC reported that nearly 81,000 individual charges of employment discrimination were filed in its office.21 Of these, just 428 enforcement
lawsuits were filed by the agency in federal district courts.22
Compared to “typical” district court litigation,23 the EEOC data cases have
a great deal of consistency among them. The EEOC, as a federal government
agency and frequent filer in federal district courts, is a repeat, advantaged player in federal litigation.24 The complaints filed by the regional attorneys across
the country are very similar to each other in formatting and content.25 The de-

17

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2012). This includes, for example, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and subsequent legislation amending it, the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Laws Enforced by EEOC, U.S. EQUAL
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes [https://perma.cc/
WX7G-P6CZ] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
18 Filing a Lawsuit, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, www.eeoc.gov/employ
ees/lawsuit.cfm [https://perma.cc/RU28-SKM4] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016). Statutory and
administrative procedure require nearly all employment discrimination complaints that may
eventually be brought into federal court to first be filed with the EEOC. The notable exception are those complaints based on age discrimination claims. Id.
19 Litigation Procedures, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.
gov/eeoc/litigation/procedures.cfm [https://perma.cc/D8Y7-BA35] (last visited Mar. 11,
2016).
20 Id.
21 Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2015, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm [https://perma.cc
/2SMZ-VDE8] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
22 EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1997 Through FY 2015, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm [https://per
ma.cc/N6XA-EVVM] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016). See generally C. Elizabeth Hirsh, Settling
for Less? Organizational Determinants of Discrimination-Charge Outcomes, 42 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 239 (2008).
23 See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 232 (2013) (noting that “many cases are filed by pro se or emotional litigants and by litigants represented by inept or inexperienced lawyers”).
24 See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).
25 Compare Complaint, EEOC v. Vasquez Bros., Inc., No. 5:05-cv-03867-PVT, 2005 WL
5473972 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2005), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-CA0050-0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/7U75-PKKA], with Complaint, EEOC v. Atlanta Gastroenterology Assocs., No. 1:05-cv-2504-TWT, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101580 (N.D. Ga. Sept.
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fendants are employers, typically medium- and large-sized businesses and corporations.26 The majority of cases are resolved via a Consent Decree.27 This
level of consistency among the cases in the data is very helpful from a social
science perspective—it is much easier and more reliable to compare “apples to
apples”—but, at the same time, the atypical nature of the data means the cases
are not wholly representative of federal district court litigation. The degree to
which this limitation affects this project’s ability to speak to the broader outputs
of MJ activities like presiding over settlement conferences, making decisions
on discovery motions, and serving as consent judges is less clear.
B. Boyd Data
The second source of data for this analysis is referred to as the Boyd data.
These data, originally collected by the author here for a Ph.D. dissertation project on the federal district courts,28 include a sample of cases terminated in
twenty-five federal district courts from 2000 to 2006.29 The issue areas provided for inclusion in the study were identified by their nature of suit code (NOS)
and include civil rights,30 other contract disputes,31 intellectual-property
rights,32 and personal-injury torts.33

27, 2005), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-GA-0003-0001.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/NF5T-9FQB].
26 See Margo Schlanger & Pauline Kim, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
and Structural Reform of the American Workplace, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1519, 1583 (2014).
27 See id. In the EEOC data, 1,520 cases—or 68.25 percent—terminated via a consent
judgment. See EEOC LITIG. PROJECT, supra note 11.
28 See generally Christina L. Boyd, Placing Federal District Courts in the Judicial Hierarchy,
(Aug. 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington University in St. Louis),
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/43 [https://perma.cc/K8YB-YAEX].
29 Id. at 21–22. The data include observations from the following district courts: C.D. California, D. Colorado, D. Delaware, D. Kansas, D. Maryland, D. Rhode Island, D. South Dakota, E.D. Louisiana, E.D. Michigan, E.D. Missouri, E.D. New York, E.D. Virginia, M.D.
Florida, M.D. Pennsylvania, N.D. Florida, N.D. Georgia, N.D. Iowa, N.D. Illinois, N.D. Indiana, N.D. Ohio, N.D. Oklahoma, N.D. Texas, S.D. New York, W.D. Tennessee, and W.D.
Washington. Id. These districts were selected for inclusion in the study based on their distribution across circuits and the willingness of their chief judges to grant me PACER fee exemptions. Due to data collection hurdles and decisions, not all of these districts are represented in every analysis of the Boyd data. The opinion content analysis below does not
include N.D. Indiana, N.D. Ohio, or N.D. Oklahoma. The MJ report and recommendation
analysis does not include D. Delaware, E.D. Missouri, N.D. Illinois, W.D. Tennessee, or
W.D. Washington.
30 Codes 440 (Other Civil Suits), 442 (Employment), 443 (Housing/Accommodations), and
444 (Welfare). Nature of Suit Codes, PUB. ACCESS TO CT. ELECTRONIC RECS., https://
www.pacer.gov/documents/natsuit.pdf [https://perma.cc/KG2B-VQCJ] (last visited Mar. 21,
2016).
31 Code 190 (Other Contract). Id.
32 Codes 820 (Copyrights), 830 (Patent), and 840 (Trademark). Id.
33 Codes 310 (Airplane), 320 (Assault, Libel, & Slander), 340 (Marine), 350 (Motor Vehicle), and 360 (Other Personal Injury). Id.
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Originally collected to address district court decision making and the interaction of these courts with the rest of the federal judicial hierarchy,34 these data
have been expanded to cover related questions on the opinion writing of judges
in federal district courts35 and the potential principal-agent relationship between
DJs and MJs.36 As a result, the data include coded details for each case that are
quite relevant to this current project, such as the outcome of the case, including
whether there is a settlement, and whether the plaintiff or defendant wins (via,
e.g., a dispositive motion or trial); the presence of an appeal following the final
district court resolution and, if present, the outcome on appeal; and the identity
of the presiding judge, including MJs presiding over cases after the parties have
consented to MJ jurisdiction (consent MJs) The data also include details on MJ
reports and recommendations (R&Rs) in the cases from the identity of the reporting MJ, the identity of the supervising DJ, whether the DJ adopts the R&R,
and whether a party in the case opposes the recommendation. Finally, the data
include original content details on district court opinions that extend to who authored each opinion, whether the opinion is published, the length (in words) of
each opinion, and the number of outward citations within the opinions.
The Boyd data nicely complement the EEOC data. The broader set of issue
areas and litigant types within them better represent the “typical” variation in
civil cases in federal courts described above than the much less variable EEOC
district court litigation. This breadth thus provides a way to check, at least in
part, whether the EEOC data MJ results hold in other settings. The Boyd data
are much less fine-grained—no detailed coding on, for example, non-case terminating motions, complaint contents, or the type and extent of the relief provided upon resolution—but, at the same time, the data provide content on opinions and R&Rs that simply are not in the EEOC data.
C. Notes on Analyzing the Data
This project utilizes data exploration to examine questions of interest. The
project lacks traditional hypothesis testing—something that is better suited for
future projects after we have enough information to craft theoretically informed
expectations—and the project does not perform causal inference. Any interpretation of MJ-related output statistics, like that presented here, must proceed
with caution. Case assignment methods to MJs vary significantly by district,
but randomization should not be assumed. As a result, any observed differences

34

For the projects resulting from these initial question see Christina L. Boyd, The Hierarchical Influence of Courts of Appeals on District Courts, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 113 (2015);
Christina L. Boyd, Litigant Status and Trial Court Appeal Mobilization, 37 LAW & POL’Y
294 (2015); Christina L. Boyd, She’ll Settle It?, 1 J.L. & CTS. 193 (2013).
35 See Christina L. Boyd, Opinion Writing in the Federal District Courts, 36 JUST. SYS. J.
254 (2015).
36 See Christina L. Boyd & Jacqueline M. Sievert, Unaccountable Justice? The Decision
Making of Magistrate Judges in the Federal District Courts, 34 JUST. SYS. J. 249 (2013).
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between MJs and DJs in the data below may be because of actual behavioral
differences but may also be the result of differences in the underlying cases.
Additionally, as the below analyses will reveal, while the initial sample
sizes in both the EEOC data and Boyd data are relatively large, the sample sizes begin to quickly shrink as the data are sliced up to examine only a subset of
cases at a time. Because the data were not originally collected for an MJfocused study, the inclusion of data points focused on consent MJs, MJauthored opinions, and MJ-authored R&Rs is not particularly high. This is most
noticeable when the data are further divided, as is the case in the last data section of the paper searching for a district court auditioning effect among MJs.
II. DESCRIBING MAGISTRATE JUDGE PARTICIPATION IN THE DATA
The first part of this data examination looks to the frequency and degree of
MJ participation in the EEOC data and Boyd data.
A. MJ Descriptives: EEOC Data
In the EEOC data, the incidence of MJs in the data can be examined in a
number of interesting ways. To begin, Figure 1 (below) details the distribution
of MJs in the data’s cases by the number of MJs present per case. MJ presence
here is broadly defined to include consent MJs, MJs hearing motions, and MJs
presiding over a docketed event like a settlement or management conference.
This number ranges from zero to four MJs per case, with the modal case having
one MJ participating at some point.37 Figure 1 displays the distribution of MJ
numbers as a percentage of cases in the data (left-hand y-axis and gray bars)
and the frequency of cases (right-hand y-axis and black diamonds). As it reveals, 56 percent of the data (1,242 cases) have one MJ participating in some
form, and nearly 10 percent of the data (218 cases) have two MJs participating
in some form. Thirty-three percent of the cases (738 observations) have no MJs
present (which means, of course, that 67 percent of cases have one or more
MJ). Just over 1 percent of the cases (26 cases) have three MJs present in them,
and three additional cases have four coded MJs participating during the docketed life of the cases.

37

This count of MJ incidence errs on the side of undercounting MJ participation. Although
the EEOC data coding scheme covers most judge activity in a case, there is potential that
additional MJs participated in a case in a way that did not yield coding. For example, the
coding for discovery motions captures substantive, contested discovery motions like motions
to compel or motions for protective orders. The coding does not extend to discovery motions
on things like timing or numerical limits. If an MJ’s activity in a case only involves ruling on
a discovery motion of the latter type, he or she is not counted in Figure 1.
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FIGURE 1: NUMBER OF MAGISTRATE JUDGES PRESENT PER CASE

Let us look more deeply into MJ participation in the EEOC data cases. One
important type of MJ participation in the EEOC data is consent MJs. Out of the
2227 cases considered in the EEOC data, 103 of them—under 5 percent—have
consent MJs presiding. How is this number distributed across the district courts
within the data? To illustrate this, Figure 2 depicts the percentage of the EEOC
data cases hailing from each district court that have a consent MJ presiding
over them.38 To save space, the figure only depicts those districts with a consent MJ rate above 7 percent. While the very small district-by-district samples
require interpretation caution, the figure does indicate that a number of districts
have high rates of consent MJ participation and, likely, very low rates of nonconsent to MJ jurisdiction. The District of Vermont, District of Montana, Middle District of Louisiana, and Middle District of Alabama all have consent MJ
rates at or above 40 percent while the Northern District of Mississippi, Western
District of North Carolina, and Central District of Illinois have consent MJ
rates at or above 20 percent. Even a district like the Northern District of Illinois, which at 126 has the most cases in the EEOC data of any district, has
fourteen consent MJ cases—i.e., 11 percent. On the low end of consent MJ participation (not depicted in Figure 2) are districts like Western Washington (one
38

Because the EEOC data utilizes sampling (not constructed based on MJ participation) and
does not represent the universe of EEOC-brought cases during the years of the study, these
percentages reflect only the sampled data. That means, for example, that while a district like
Vermont has a 100 percent consent MJ rate in the sample, it may well have most of its cases
assigned to a district court judge.
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out of sixty cases), Central California (one out of sixty-five cases), Maryland
(one out of seventy-eight cases), Eastern Michigan (one out of eighty-three cases), and fifty-two additional districts with no consent MJs at all within the data.
FIGURE 2: PERCENTAGE OF CASES IN THE EEOC DATA,
BY DISTRICT COURT, WITH A CONSENT MJ PRESIDING

An important benefit of the EEOC data is its motion-level coding. In other
words, nearly every motion is coded from the moment the plaintiff or defendant
files the motion to the moment the motion is resolved by the judge (or the case
terminates while the motion is still pending). This permits an examination of all
of the motions, by type, that MJs resolve. Later, this article will dig into the direction of those motion rulings, but first, Figure 3 displays the breakdown of
motion rulings of MJs and, for comparison, DJs, in the data. The gray bars in
the figure indicate the percentage of MJ motion activity allocated to each type
of motion while the black bars do the same for DJs. As the gray bars indicate,
most MJ motion activity in the data involves discovery motions. Indeed, nearly
75 percent of MJ ruled-on motions (N=1138) were discovery motions. By
comparison, as the black bar shows, only 27 percent of DJ motions (N=897)
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were discovery motions. MJs also heard a significant number of motions by the
plaintiff to intervene in the case (15 percent of their motions; N=225).39 Of
course, neither of these types of motions—interventions nor discovery—require
the parties to consent to MJ jurisdiction.40 By comparison, dispositive motions
like summary judgment or involuntary dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim, require consent MJs.41
FIGURE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF MOTIONS AMONG MJS AND DJS IN THE EEOC DATA

Moving beyond motions, Table 1 provides descriptive details on other areas in the EEOC data where MJs participated in cases. These areas include MJs
presiding over scheduling, management, and status conferences, making ADR
referrals, and presiding over settlement conferences. As Table 1 indicates, these
are each areas where MJs are prolific and participate in numbers that rival or
even exceed those of their district judge colleagues. The EEOC data reveal
1,020 instances of MJs presiding over scheduling, management, and status conferences in cases. This accounts for nearly 41 percent of all instances of these
types of important organizational conferences in the data. There were also
eighty-four times that an MJ referred a case to ADR (28 percent of all such re39

In the EEOC data, that usually involves the complainant seeking to intervene as a private
plaintiff in the EEOC’s lawsuit.
40 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (2012).
41 See id. §§ 636(b)(1)(A), (c)(1). The EEOC motion data does not capture R&Rs on a motion. Rather, the DJ’s decision to adopt, modify, or not adopt the R&R is coded as the final
motion outcome.
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ferrals). Finally, 82 percent of the settlement conferences in the data (N=562)
were presided over by MJs.
TABLE 1: DISTRICT AND MAGISTRATE JUDGE CASE ACTIVITY RATES42

Presiding Over Scheduling,
Management, or Status
Conferences
Making ADR Referral
Presiding Over
Settlement Conferences
Consent to Trial by
Magistrate Judge

District
Judges

Magistrate
Judges

Combined
Total

1476
(58.97%)

1020
(40.75%)

2496
(99.72%)

212
(71.62%)
120
(17.57%)

84
(28.38%)
562
(82.28%)

296
(100%)
682
(99.85%)

N/A

103
(4.6% of cases
in EEOC data)

103

Viewed together in this descriptive sense, the EEOC data confirm that the
parties in these cases are often working with MJs and doing so in a variety of
contexts. These party-MJ interactions include MJs presiding over cases as the
assigned judge, MJs hearing and deciding motions, and MJs working closely
with the parties in scheduling or settlement conferences.
B. MJ Descriptives: Boyd Data
In the Boyd data, 274 of 5,047 cases have an MJ presiding over the case by
the consent of the parties. This is 5.43 percent of the total Boyd data. The distribution of these cases, provided as a percentage of each district court’s total
cases within the data, is provided in Figure 4. With a higher total number of observations than the EEOC data, Figure 4 provides additional useful information
on how often district courts are successfully (via parties’ consent) assigning
cases to MJs. As the figure indicates, over 24 percent of the N.D. of Iowa cases
and over 18 percent of the N.D. of Indiana cases in the data have an assigned
MJ. Other high percentage districts include M.D. Pennsylvania (9.5 percent),
D. South Dakota (8 percent), N.D. Ohio (7 percent), D. Kansas (6.4 percent),
and E.D. Virginia (6 percent). The figure excludes districts with MJ consent
participation below 1.5 percent—in this case, that is C.D. California, D. Rhode
Island, E.D. Louisiana, E.D. Michigan, and N.D. Florida.43
42

These statistics were computed using the EEOC data. The data do not preclude multiple
observations or incidents of the above events per case. Percentages were computed by event
(i.e., by row). Some rows do not add up to 100 percent because of excluded non-MJs and
non-MJs from the calculation. These excluded judges are circuit judges hearing cases in district courts by designation. All EEOC data computations exclude consolidated cases.
43 Comparing these numbers to EEOC data described in Figure 2 and the surrounding text is
tempting but does not likely provide much insight. Top performers in the Boyd data, includ-
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FIGURE 4: PERCENTAGE OF CASES IN THE BOYD DATA,
BY DISTRICT COURT, WITH A CONSENT MJ PRESIDING

The Boyd data code MJ R&Rs and thus provide interesting insight into this

important MJ activity. Within the Boyd data, 364 of 5,047 cases, or 7.2 percent
of the data, have R&Rs. Table 2 provides descriptive details on the distribution
of these R&Rs across the different types of case motions and judge rules. Interestingly, the modal case area where MJs issue R&Rs is involuntary motions to
dismiss. Forty-eight percent of the MJ R&Rs in the data involved these motions. This provides an interesting statistic when combined with Figure 3’s details on types of motions for MJs in the EEOC data. In Figure 3, there were
very few instances of MJs hearing involuntary motions to dismiss as consent
judges, a result driven by the relatively small number of consent MJs. With Table 2’s result regarding MJs and R&Rs, we find confirmation that it is not that
ing N.D. Iowa, M.D. Pennsylvania, D. South Dakota, and N.D. Ohio, had no observations of
consent MJs in the EEOC data, a result that is much more likely due to the different sampling schemes within these two data sets than MJ assignment practices in these districts. The
Boyd data drew a random sample of 250 cases per district within the issue areas of focus. By
contrast, the EEOC data’s sampling scheme combined districts.
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MJs are not making decisions on motions to dismiss but, rather, that they are
doing so in a non-binding R&R setting rather than as the consent judge. MJs
also issue a number of R&Rs on motions for summary judgment (22 percent).
Other types of motions and activities show up less often in the R&R context for
MJs—from discovery motions to motions to proceed in forma pauperis. The
reasons for this likely vary, from the low frequency of the motions to the lack
of need for a R&R given the non-dispositive nature of the motion.
TABLE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
IN DATA, BY STAGE OF CASE44

Motion to Dismiss (involuntary)
Motion for Summary Judgment
Motion for Entry of Default Judgment
Issues related to fees, damages, sanctions,
and/or counsel
Motion to proceed IFP
Settlement Entry or Enforcement
Discovery Motion
Motion for Injunction

Reports and
Recommendations
in Data
48.26% (N=166)
22.09% (N=76)
6.98% (N=24)
6.98% (N=24)
4.94% (N=17)
2.62% (N=9)
2.03% (N=7)
2.03% (N=7)

Within the Boyd data, seventy-five of the 693 opinions were authored by
MJs. Of these, the distribution of type of opinion is provided in Table 3. As the
table reveals, these opinions are almost evenly divided between R&Rs (31 percent), non-R&R discovery motions (32 percent), and opinions in which the MJ
serves as the consent judge (29 percent). More details on the contents of these
MJ opinions are provided below.
TABLE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE OPINION TYPES45
Opinion Activity
Magistrate Judge as Consent Judge
Report and Recommendation

Activity Rate
29% (N=22)
31% (N=23)

Discovery Motion
Issues related to fees, damages, sanctions,
and/or counsel

32% (N=24)
8% (N=6)

III. ANALYZING DECISION MAKING AND OUTPUTS: MAGISTRATE JUDGES V.
44

Data source is Boyd data. Low values of R&Rs are excluded from the table but included
in percentage calculations. These include stays, motions to amend complaints, and motions
to transfer.
45 Data source is Boyd Opinion Data.
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DISTRICT JUDGES
With a descriptive sense of MJ presence and activity in cases now in hand,
it is time to move to an examination of the decision-making and outputs of MJs
and how these compare to DJs. To begin this inquiry, Table 4 examines the rulings of DJs and MJs on important motions in the EEOC data. The Table captures the probability of each type of motion being granted by whether the deciding judge is a DJ or MJ.46
Here, and in many of the results tables below, the right-hand column “Difference” details whether the reported statistics for DJs and MJs within a particular category are different from one another in a statistically significant way. If
the two numbers (whether they are probabilities, percentages, or raw numbers)
are not statistically different from one another, this column will indicate [NS]—
i.e., not statistically significant. This means that even though the numbers reported for the DJs and the MJs may appear to be different from one another,
statistically speaking, the two numbers’ differences cannot be distinguished
from zero. As an example, take the “Motion for Summary Judgment” row in
Table 4. The Table reports that the probability of DJs granting these motions is
0.46, and the probability of MJs granting these motions is 0.526—a difference
of 0.066. However, this difference is not statistically meaningful, something
that is likely driven by the small total number of MJ observations (N=38) and
the large variation in MJ activity in deciding summary judgment motions.
Just as MJs and DJs have no difference in their outputs for motions for
summary judgment, there is no statistical difference in the outputs of MJs and
DJs in rulings on involuntary motions to dismiss (where the average probability
of granting for both is around 0.32). The same is true for motions for judgment
as a matter of law (probabilities of granting between 0.19 and 0.25, not statistically different) and for motions by plaintiffs to intervene (probabilities of granting around 0.97 for both types of judges). In other words, at least within EEOC
litigation cases, there is no systematic difference in motion outcome based on
whether the deciding judge is a DJ or MJ.

46

This table considers granted motions to be those granted in whole or in part. It excludes
all motions that are never decided and those filed by the parties as consent motions.
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TABLE 4: PROBABILITY OF GRANTING MOTION, BY JUDGE AND MOTION TYPE47
Motion Type
Motion to Dismiss (Involuntary)
Motion for Summary Judgment
Motion for Judgment as a Matter
of Law
Plaintiff Motion to Intervene
Discovery Motion

District
Judges
0.317
(N=265)
0.460
(N=661)
0.192
(N=78)
0.964
(N=499)
0.650
(N=491)

Magistrate
Judges
0.333
(N=18)
0.526
(N=38)
0.250
(N=12)
0.970
(N=200)
0.704
(N=830)

Difference
[NS]
[NS]
[NS]
[NS]
+0.05*

The one exception to the lack of statistical difference in motion outcomes
is found at the bottom of Table 4 with discovery motions. Recall that the EEOC
data’s “discovery motions” only capture substantive discovery motions like
motions to compel, strike, or enter a protective order. They do not extend to
more procedural or administrative motions like limits on the number of pages
or the timing of discovery. As we learned in Figure 3 above, discovery motions
are an important, high-propensity part of MJs’ jobs in civil cases. Table 4 reaffirms this with the 830 MJ discovery motion observations. Additionally, the
Table indicates that MJs are more likely to grant discovery motions than their
DJ counterparts—with the average probability of MJs granting being a statistically significant 0.05 higher than DJs. In other words, MJs are 5 percent more
likely to grant discovery motions than DJs.
To further examine this difference between MJs and DJs resolving EEOC
discovery motions, Table 5 breaks down discovery motion outcomes by type
and disaggregates the grant in full motions from the partial grant motions. Upon doing so, Table 5’s results indicate that the real differences between DJ and
MJ discovery motion outcomes are in the partial grant and denial subcategories.
MJ and DJ discovery motion outputs are nearly identical in the grant in full category—both do so about 41 percent of the time. MJs, however, are more likely
to grant discovery motions in part (30 vs. 23 percent), and, by contrast, DJs
seem to prefer to deny these discovery motions in full (35 vs. 30 percent).

47

The source for the data is the EEOC data. “*” designates that the difference is statistically
significant at the p < 0.05 level. [NS] indicates that the difference between reported probabilities is not statistically significant.
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TABLE 5: DISCOVERY MOTION OUTCOMES, BY JUDGE TYPE48
Motion Outcome
Grant in Full
Partial Grant or
Partial Denial

District Judges
0.422 (N=207)

Magistrate Judges
0.405 (N=336)

0.228 (N=112)

0.299 (N=248)

Denial in Full

0.350 (N=172)

0.296 (N=246)

It is entirely possible that this difference in discovery motion results between MJs and DJs is driven less by differences in behavior and more by differences in the types and complexity of discovery motions heard. Since most of
the discovery motions heard by MJs in the EEOC data are heard by referral
MJs rather than by consent MJs, it may be that the discovery motions that DJs
hear and decide themselves are less complex and time-consuming than those
referred to MJs to manage and resolve. If that is the case, the resulting differences observed in Tables 4 and 5 are much more likely to be driven by the underlying motion pools.
We can move now from an examination of DJ and MJ outputs at the motion stage to the case-outcome stage. To start this, Table 6 provides a breakdown of case outcome types by judge type (DJs vs. consent MJs) for the EEOC
data. As it reveals, for most types of case outcomes, their likelihood is indistinguishable based on whether the presiding judge for the case is a DJ or MJ.
However, for two types of outcomes—settlements (broadly defined here to include private settlements and consent judgments) and jury verdicts in favor of
the defendant—there is an appreciable difference between MJ- and DJ-assigned
cases. MJ-presided EEOC cases are 7 percent less likely to settle than DJpresided EEOC cases. By comparison, MJ-presided cases are 7 percent more
likely to resolve by a defendant jury verdict than DJ-assigned cases. Both differences are statistically significant.49

48

The source for the data is the EEOC data.
On a related note, in EEOC cases where one or more settlement conferences were held
(see Table 1), the likelihood of those cases settling was very high—well above 80 percent.
However, the position of the judge(s) presiding over those settlement conferences (MJ or DJ)
has no noticeable effect on whether the case ultimately settles. DJ-presided settlement conferences lead to case settlement 81 percent of the time, whereas MJ-presided settlement conferences ultimately lead to settlement 83 percent of the time. The small difference between
these two numbers is not statistically significant. This analysis does not double count cases,
meaning that cases with more than one settlement conference are merged into one observation. If we treat each settlement conference as a single observation, the probability of case
settlement rises (87 percent and 90 percent, respectively), but the differences between the
types of presiding judges remain statistically insignificant.
49
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TABLE 6: CASE OUTCOME TYPES BY JUDGE TYPE50
Case Outcome Type
Consent Judgments & Settlements
Other Voluntary Dismissals
(Non-Settlements)
Involuntary Dismissals
Default Judgment
Plaintiff Summary Judgment
Defendant Summary Judgment
Plaintiff Jury Verdict
Defendant Jury Verdict
Plaintiff Bench Verdict

District
Judges
84.7%
[N=1733]
3.2%
[N=65]
0.5%
[N=11]
2.1%
[N=42]
0.29%
[N=6]
5.4%
[N=110]
1.9%
[N=39]
1.8%
[N=36]
0.2%
[N=4]

Magistrate
Judges
77.8%
[N=70]
2.2%
[N=2]
1.1%
[N=1]
1.1%
[N=1]
0%
[N=0]
3.3%
[N=3]
3.3%
[N=3]
8.9%
[N=8]
2.2%
[N=2]

Difference
-0.07*
[NS]
[NS]
[NS]
[NS]
[NS]
[NS]
+0.07*
[NS]

In the Boyd data, the case outcome is coded as a three-category variable
based on whether the final resolution of the case is a settlement, a plaintiff victory, or a defendant victory.51 The results of the comparison of DJ- and MJassigned cases for outcome type in the Boyd data are provided in Table 7. As
the table indicates, MJ-assigned cases are 9 percent less likely to produce a defendant victory (via, for example, a bench or jury trial or a dispositive motion)
than DJ cases and 9 percent more likely to produce a settlement than DJ cases.
Once again, it seems that who the assigned judge is, MJ or DJ, may affect the
case outcome.

50

The source for the data is the EEOC data. “*” designates that the difference is statistically
significant at the p < 0.05 level. [NS] indicates that the difference between reported percentages is not statistically significant. Percentages are calculated by judge type for case outcome
type and do not include excluded case outcome types. All included MJ observations were
party consents to trial by MJ.
51 Party victories are determined based on the final case resolution. If the plaintiff wins on
one or more claims at trial or via a dispositive motion, she is generally classified as the winner for purposes of this coding scheme.
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TABLE 7: CASE WINNERS AND OUTCOME BY JUDGE TYPE52
Case Outcome
Plaintiff Wins
Defendant
Wins
Case Settled

District
Judges
0.06
(N=266)
0.33
(N=1459)
0.60
(N=2609)

Magistrate
Judges
0.06
(N=66)
0.24
(N=17)
0.69
(N=187)

Difference53
[NS]
-0.09*
+0.09*

As Tables 6 and 7 make clear, the baseline settlement probability between
the EEOC data cases and the Boyd data cases is quite different, with the former
being much more likely to settle than the more variable litigation found in the
Boyd data. This should come as no surprise given the EEOC’s litigation filtering process and goals.54 These underlying differences are likely to hold at least
some of the blame for the two tables’ opposite direction results for case settlement between DJs and MJs. The fact that the Boyd data—i.e., cases with a
much lower predisposition for settlement than the EEOC data—indicate a positive MJ effect on settlement is one that could be meaningful.
What about other case outcome products beyond who wins or the type of
resolution? Does whether the assigned judge is an MJ or DJ matter there? Table
8 weighs in on this with some case-outcome product-descriptive statistics for
MJs and DJs in the EEOC data. Interestingly, MJ-assigned cases have a 5 percent higher rate of appeal than DJ-assigned cases (7 percent appeal rate vs. 12
percent appeal rate). This may be driven, at least in part, by the outcome-type
differences observed in Table 6. There are no statistically meaningful differences between MJ and DJ cases for the question of whether any relief is obtained (injunctive or monetary) by the plaintiff, the average amount the defendant pays (if any), or the number of pages in the injunctive-relief document
(when present).

52

The source for the data is the Boyd data.
“*” designates that the difference is statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level. [NS] indicates that the difference between reported probabilities is not statistically significant.
54 See supra note 19.
53
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TABLE 8: CASE OUTCOME PRODUCTS BY JUDGE TYPE55
Case Outcome Products
Rate of Appeal
Relief Obtained56
Amount Defendant Pays
Number of pages in injunctive
relief document

District
Judges
0.07
(N=2131)
0.89
(N=2067)
$281,015
(N=1350)
9.64
(N=1194)

Magistrate
Judges
0.12
(N=96)
0.86
(N=91)
$145,878
(N=50)
9.52
(N=44)

Difference
+0.05**
[NS]
[NS]
[NS]

For the Boyd data, Table 9 indicates that there is no difference between MJ
and DJ cases when it comes to the rate of appeals from the district court outcome (both around 11 percent) or, for cases that are appealed, the likelihood
that those district court outcomes are reversed or remanded, in whole or in part
(around 12 percent for both).
TABLE 9: APPEAL RATES AND OUTCOMES BY JUDGE TYPE57

Rate of Appeal
Rate of Reversal (in whole or
part) on Appeal

District
Judges
0.12
(N=4773)
0.12
(N=565)

Magistrate
Judges
0.11
(N=274)
0.13
(N=31)

Difference58
[NS]
[NS]

Figure 5 depicts the distribution of case resolution times (in days)59 for the
EEOC data (top subfigure, (a)) and the Boyd data (bottom subfigure, (b)) by
whether the presiding judge was a DJ or MJ. It does this through box plots. The
box itself in each plot represents the interquartile range of the data for each
judge—from the twenty-fifth to seventy-fifth percentile of data. The white line
running vertically through the box represents the median. The horizontal
whiskers extending out of the box cover the data within 1.5 interquartile ranges
55

The source for the data is the EEOC data. “**” designates that the difference is statistically significant at the p < 0.10 level. [NS] indicates that the difference between reported probabilities or numbers is not statistically significant. Percentages are calculated by judge type
for case outcome type and do not include excluded case outcome types. All included MJ observations were party consents to trial by MJ.
56 This indicates whether the plaintiff received any relief (monetary or injunctive) in the
case, whether by court disposition or settlement.
57 The source for the data is the Boyd data.
58 [NS] indicates that the difference between reported probabilities is not statistically significant.
59 The number of days to resolution is computed in both data sets as a simple subtraction of
the filing date from the resolution date (pre-appeal).
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on the upper and lower extensions of the data, respectively.60 The small black
dots beyond the whiskers represent severe outliers.
Figure 5 (a)’s depiction of the days to resolution for MJ and DJ cases in the
EEOC data reveals a similar shape and distribution between the two sets of
cases. However, the MJ case resolution times are noticeably shifted upward.
Indeed, the mean number of days to resolution for consent MJ cases is seventysix days longer than DJ cases (514 days for MJ cases vs. 438 days for DJ cases). This difference is statistically significant at the p<0.05 level.
Figure 5 (b)’s depiction of the same for the Boyd data provides very similar conclusions. Visually, the MJ figure is very noticeably shifted to the right in
its distribution. The mean number of days to resolution for consent MJ cases in
the Boyd data is 139 days longer than for DJ cases (487 days vs. 346 days for
DJ cases). This difference is also statistically significant at the p<0.05 level.
The consistency of this result across the two data sets, particularly given their
very different types of cases and the findings noted above regarding the differences in the likelihood of case settlements between the two data sets, makes it
all the more notable and powerful.61

60

See Nicholas J. Cox, Speaking Stata: Creating and Varying Box Plots, 9 STATA J. 478,
480 (2009).
61 However, as with all statistical results discussed within this Article, it is important to remember that the observed differences between MJ and DJ case processing times could just
as likely be due to differences in the underlying cases resolved by these two types of judges
(due to non-random assignment to the former group) than behavioral differences. Nancy J.
King, Fred L. Cheesman, and Brian J. Ostrom also made this point in their study of federal
district court habeas corpus cases. In finding that cases with an MJ R&R had a significantly
longer case processing time than those without one, the authors cogently note that
the analysis only tells us that among all cases, controlling for other factors, those with dispositive orders by magistrate judges are longer than those without. It does not indicate whether the
use of magistrate judges in a given district helps the district judges to dispose of these cases
more quickly than they would be able to without delegating the initial decisions to magistrate
judges. It is also possible that the causal relationship is reversed for this variable, that is, that district judges in the districts that were already taking the longest time to process these cases are
most likely to refer non-capital habeas cases to magistrate judges.

NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT
COURTS 73 (2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf [https://perma.cc
/2R3E-D8CE].
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FIGURE 5(a): DISTRIBUTION OF CASE RESOLUTION TIMES

FIGURE 5(b): DISTRIBUTION OF CASE RESOLUTION TIMES

Figure 6 depicts a similar box plot distribution of data, only this time for
the EEOC data’s number of docket entries per case.62 While this measure
shares many similarities with the days to resolution measure described above, it
may pick up something slightly different. Rather than pure passage of time, it is
focused more on the amount of activity in a case—from motions to conferences
62

The number of docket entries within the data is coded in the EEOC data as the number of
numbered entries appearing on a docket sheet for a case. Unnumbered entries on a docket
sheet do not get counted.
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to postponed trial dates—much of which requires judicial management. For this
measure, the differences between the MJ and DJ case distributions are noteworthy. While the median values of docket entries are nearly identical, MJ cases
have a much larger interquartile range (in other words, a wider range values for
the middle 50 percent of values). This leads to statistically distinct mean values
of docket entries for MJs and DJs. MJs have an average of 60.2 docket entries
while DJs have a mean of 45.6 docket entries. This difference of 14.4 docket
entries is statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level.63 This provides some initial evidence that consent MJ cases may involve more activity and management
than traditional EEOC cases.
FIGURE 6: DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER OF DOCKET ENTRIES

For a final area of inquiry into the activity of MJs compared to DJs, Table
10 provides details on the opinions written by DJs and MJs in the Boyd data.64
This includes whether the opinions are published, their length in words, and the
63

One, two, or three of the added docket entries for MJs per case are likely to involve consent to MJ jurisdiction. Docket sheets usually have at least one numbered docket entry that
reflects the consent and reassignment. See, e.g., Civil Docket at no. 127, EEOC v. Everydry
Waterproof, 556 F. Supp. 2d 213 (W.D.N.Y 2008) (No. 6:01-cv-06329-MWP) (“CONSENT
to Jurisdiction by US Magistrate Judge. Case reassigned to Magistrate Judge Marian W.
Payson.”). Some case dockets include additional entries capturing the reminder to the parties
that they need to return their consent forms. See, e.g., Civil Docket at no. 3, EEOC v. Sun
Pac. Shippers, Inc., No. 3:04-cv-02950-JCS (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2004) (“CLERK’S NOTICE
TO PLAINTIFF RE: Consent to Proceed before a U.S. Magistrate Judge. Form due by AUG.
17, 2004.”).
64 For this data set, “opinions written” includes “every opinion made available on Lexis
(which includes published Federal Supplement and Federal Rules Decisions opinions as
well as written and unpublished opinions for the cases in the dataset).” Boyd, supra note 5,
at 261.
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number of outward citations in the opinions. For the first of these, opinion publication, this reflects whether the resulting written opinion was published in either the Federal Supplement or Federal Rules Decisions.65 As Table 10 indicates, MJ opinions are much less likely to be published than DJ opinions. Even
after excluding MJ discovery opinions, MJ opinions are still 18 percent less
likely to be published than DJ opinions. The difference continues to be large
(15 percent) when MJ R&Rs are instead excluded from the data.
Despite the differences in publication status between MJ and DJ opinions,
there are not statistically meaningful differences in the content, as measured by
length66 and outward citations,67 for these writings.68 For opinion length, DJ
opinions average 4,228 words each, and MJ opinions average 4,496 words
each. For total outward citations (to federal appellate opinions, other district
court opinions, or state court opinions), DJs cite an average of 12.58 outside
opinions, and MJs cite an average of 13.43 outside opinions. These numbers
shrink to just below ten when only federal appellate court citations are counted.

65

For a scholarly treatment of opinion publication in federal district courts, see generally
Stephen J. Choi et al., What Do Federal District Judges Want? An Analysis of Publications,
Citations, and Reversals, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 518 (2012).
66 Opinion length captures the number of words in the body of the opinion following the
name of the opinion authoring judge.
67 Outward opinion citations per opinion captures the number of total citations and federal
appellate citations only in each opinion. The coding scheme only counts unique citations and
only counts string citations as one citation.
68 Table 10’s length and outward citation calculations exclude MJ discovery opinions. These
opinions tend to be short (average of 1,738 words each) and low on outward citations (4.88
per case total; 2.46 per case federal). Their inclusion in the Table 10 calculations does lower
the MJ means, but the resulting numbers continue to not be statistically distinguishable from
the DJ means.
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TABLE 10: OPINION DETAILS BY JUDGE TYPE69

Opinion Publication—All
Opinions
Opinion Publication—Excluding
MJ Discovery Opinions
Opinion Publication—Excluding
MJ R&R Opinions
Opinion Length
(in Words)
Opinion Outward Citations
(all Citations)
Opinion Outward Citations
(Federal Courts Only)

District
Judges
0.32
(N=618)
0.32
(N=618)
0.32
(N=618)
4228 words
(N=616)
12.58 citations
(N=616)
9.52 citations
(N=616)

Magistrate
Judges
0.12
(N=75)
0.14
(N=51)
0.17
(N=52)
4496 words
(N=51)
13.43 citations
(N=51)
9.82 citations
(N=51)

Difference
-0.20*
-0.18**
-0.15*
[NS]
[NS]
[NS]

IV. ANALYZING DECISION MAKING AND OUTPUTS: A PREVIOUS MAGISTRATE
JUDGE EXPERIENCE EFFECT?
Let us turn now to an examination of whether prior experience as an MJ affects the behavior of DJs. To do this, I will once again utilize the EEOC and
Boyd data set and ask many of the same underlying questions regarding judge
behavior throughout district court cases. Here, however, only DJs will be examined, divided into those with and without background experience serving as
MJs prior to their nomination and successful confirmation to the district court.
Table 11 begins this exercise by detailing the motion decision-making behavior of DJs with and without MJ experience. As Table 11 indicates, there is
no statistically meaningful difference between these two types of DJs for any of
the examined motions.

69

The source for the data is the Boyd data. Reported opinion lengths and citation counts exclude MJ discovery opinions. See the text for details on the content of those MJ discovery
opinions. “*” designates that the difference is statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level;
“**” designates that the difference is statistically significant at the p < 0.10 level.
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TABLE 11: PROBABILITY OF GRANTING MOTION BY JUDGE AND MOTION TYPE: DISTRICT
JUDGES WITH AND WITHOUT MAGISTRATE JUDGE EXPERIENCE70

Motion Type
Motion to Dismiss (Involuntary)
Motion for Summary
Judgment
Motion for Judgment as a
Matter of Law
Motion to Intervene
Discovery Motion

District Judges:
No Magistrate
Experience

District Judges:
Magistrate
Experience

Difference

0.32 [N=242]

0.26 [N=23]

[NS]

0.46 [N=632]

0.45 [N=29]

[NS]

0.20 [N=75]

0 [N=3]

[NS]

0.96 [N=472]
0.65 [N=449]

1 [N=27]
0.69 [N=42]

[NS]
[NS]

While there is no difference between DJs on their probability of granting
EEOC data motions, is there a difference in the type of outcomes stemming
from their assignment to cases? Table 12 provides insight on this very question,
revealing that while there is little difference for most outcome types, DJs with
MJ experience see their assigned cases settle 9 percent more often than DJs
without that same background experience. This is a strong and statistically significant effect, and is one of the strongest signs of evidence in this article that
there may be positive MJ effect on the likelihood of case settlement. As discussed above, EEOC-brought litigation has a very high baseline probability of
settlement. Table 12 indicates that this settlement likelihood rises to nearly 93
percent with an MJ-experienced DJ presiding over the case.

70

The source for the data is the EEOC data. “*” designates that the difference is statistically
significant at the p < 0.05 level. [NS] indicates that the difference between reported probabilities is not statistically significant.
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TABLE 12: CASE OUTCOME TYPES BY JUDGE TYPE: DISTRICT JUDGES WITH AND
WITHOUT MAGISTRATE JUDGE EXPERIENCE71

Case Outcome Type

Consent Judgments & Settlements
Other Voluntary Dismissals
(Non-Settlements)
Involuntary Dismissals
Default Judgment
Plaintiff Summary Judgment
Defendant Summary Judgment
Plaintiff Jury Verdict
Defendant Jury Verdict
Plaintiff Bench Verdict

District
Judges: No
Magistrate
Experience
84.12%
[N=1605]
3.25%
[N=62]
0.58%
[N=11]
2.10%
[N=40]
0.31%
[N=6]
5.61%
[N=107]
2.04%
[N=39]
1.78%
[N=34]
0.21%
[N=4]

District
Judges:
Magistrate
Experience
92.75%
[N=128]
2.17%
[N=3]

Difference

+0.09*
[NS]

0% [N=0]

[NS]

1.15%
[N=2]

[NS]

0% [N=0]

[NS]

2.17%
[N=3]

[NS]

0% [N=0]

[NS]

1.45%
[N=2]

[NS]

0% [N=0]

[NS]

Unlike with the MJ-focused inquiries above, this DJ-focused analysis has
the benefit of random, or at least semi-random, case assignment to the DJs.
This, plus a sizable number of observations (1,605 for no MJ experience; 128
for MJ experience), helps provide confidence that the settlement effect observed here is a real one. Even with that confidence, more examination is needed to unpack the effect. Is it driven by the MJ-experienced DJs themselves
managing the cases toward settlement? Are these judges more likely to utilize
settlement conferences and refer cases to Alternative Dispute Resolution? We
cannot even discount the possibility that the parties are more incentivized to
settle these cases out of fear of the outcome that is likely by taking an MJexperienced DJ case to trial or awaiting the ruling on a dispositive motion.
Table 13 advances the analysis between these two types of DJs into other
types of case-outcome products. It reveals that there are some notable differences in some products. In particular, the rate of appeal for MJ-experienced DJ
cases is lower than that for other DJs (0.02 vs. 0.07) and the rate of relief being
71

The source for the data is the EEOC data. “*” designates that the difference is statistically
significant at the p < 0.05 level. [NS] indicates that the difference between reported percentages is not statistically significant. Percentages are calculated by judge type for case outcome
type and do not include excluded case outcome types. All included MJ observations were
party consents to trial by MJ.
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obtained by the plaintiff is higher than that for other DJs (0.94 vs. 0.88). However, these results are driven largely by what was observed in Table 12 with the
higher rate of settlement in MJ-experienced DJ cases. With the higher rate of
settlement, the cases are less likely to be appealed and more likely to produce
relief for the plaintiff. There are no statistically meaningful differences between
these two types of judges for the other types of case-outcome products like the
amount the defendant pays or the number of pages in the injunctive relief document.
TABLE 13: CASE OUTCOME PRODUCTS BY JUDGE TYPE: DISTRICT JUDGES WITH AND
WITHOUT MAGISTRATE JUDGE EXPERIENCE72

Case Outcome Products

Rate of Appeal
Relief Obtained
Amount Defendant Pays
Number of pages in injunctive
relief document

District
Judges: No
Magistrate
Experience
0.07
(N=1989)
0.88
(N=1928)
$287,834
(N=1240)
9.6 pages
(N=1098)

District
Judges:
Magistrate
Experience
0.02
(N=142)
0.94
(N=139)
$206,023
(N=108)
10.1 pages
(N=96)

Difference

-0.05*
+0.06*
[NS]
[NS]

What about the number of days to resolution? Recall that this was an area
that produced some meaningful differences between DJs and MJs (see Figure
5). In the EEOC data, the differences in average days to case resolution are not
statistically different between DJs with and without MJ experience (438 days
and 425 days, respectively). However, in the Boyd data, the differences reemerge, albeit in a moderate fashion. There, DJs with MJ experience take, on
average, thirty-one days longer to resolve their cases than other DJs (375
(N=539) vs. 344 (N=4234); p < 0.05).
Table 14 returns to an examination of the Boyd data’s R&R coding. First,
do DJs with and without MJ experience rely on MJs at different rates to issue
R&Rs? Table 14 indicates that there is no appreciable difference between the
two types of DJs in this regard. However, for the question of whether these DJs
adopt the R&Rs at different rates, Table 14 provides preliminary evidence (caveated by a small number of MJ-experienced DJ observations) that there is a
difference here. While MJ R&Rs are almost always adopted, DJs without MJ
experience are less likely to do so than DJs with MJ experience. In concrete

72

The source for the data is the EEOC data. “*” designates that the difference is statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level. [NS] indicates that the difference between reported probabilities or numbers is not statistically significant.
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terms, DJs with MJ experience are 6 percent less likely to not adopt MJs’
R&Rs than their other DJ colleagues.
TABLE 14: REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: DISTRICT JUDGES WITH AND WITHOUT
MAGISTRATE JUDGE EXPERIENCE73

Rate of using Reports &
Recommendations
Rate of NOT adopting Reports and Recommendations

District
Judges: No
Magistrate
Experience
0.07
(N=4234)
0.06
(N=305)

District
Judges:
Magistrate
Experience
0.06
(N=539)
0 (N=33)

Difference

[NS]
-0.06**

Finally, Table 15 permits an examination of opinions written by these two
types of DJs. As it indicates, there is no difference in the rate of opinion publication. However, there is a difference in opinion length and outward citations.
Opinions written by DJs with MJ experience are, on average, 1,738 words
longer than those of their DJ counterparts’ opinions. Similarly, the citation
counts are distinct, with MJ-experienced DJs having an average of 4.5 more total outward citations and 3.9 federal appellate court outward citations in their
opinions than other DJs’ opinions. Of course, all things being equal, longer
opinions should also yield more outward citations. Here, the rate of words per
total citations for non-MJ-experienced judges is 332 words per citation. The
equivalent rate for MJ-experienced judges is 347 words per citation.

73

The source for the data is the Boyd data. “**” designates that the difference is statistically significant at the p < 0.10 level, one-tailed.
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TABLE 15: OPINION DETAILS: DISTRICT JUDGES WITH AND WITHOUT MAGISTRATE JUDGE
EXPERIENCE74

Opinion Publication
Opinion Length (in Words)
Opinion Outward Citations (All
Citations)
Opinion Outward Citations
(Federal Courts Only)

District
Judges: No
Magistrate
Experience

District Judges:
Magistrate
Experience

Difference

0.32 (N=485)

0.34 (N=133)

[NS]

3853 words
(N=483)
11.6 citations
(N=483)
8.7 citations
(N=483)

5591 words
(N=133)
16.1 citations
(N=133)
12.6 citations
(N=133)

+1738
words*
+4.5 citations*
+3.9 citations*

V. ANALYZING DECISION MAKING AND OUTPUTS: DISTRICT JUDGE
AUDITIONS?
For a final MJ-related empirical examination, I turn briefly to whether
there is evidence of an auditioning effect in the outputs of certain MJs. To do
this, the data examination here compares the outputs of MJs in the data sets
based on those who receive future district court appointments with those who
do not. To be sure, this measure of which MJs we should and should not be
most likely to expect a district court auditioning effect from is very elementary.75 In addition to measurement concerns, there are also pressing data constraints that affect this inquiry. As the above analyses of MJ versus DJ activities
indicated, the number of MJs making coded decisions in the EEOC and Boyd
data sets is, at times, quite small. A great deal of pressure is placed on this
small MJ number when it is further divided into those judges who do and do
not eventually receive Article III appointments, particularly because the former
number accounts for around 5 percent of the MJ consent judge observations in
both the EEOC data and Boyd data.
In the EEOC data, the one area with a number of coded MJ decisions is
discovery motions. Focusing there, there are some meaningful differences.
Non-elevated MJs have a probability of granting discovery motions of 0.70
74

The source for the data is the Boyd data. Reported opinion lengths and citation counts exclude MJ discovery opinions. See the text for details on the content of those MJ opinions.
“*” designates that the difference is statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level.
75 Recent scholarship has adopted more sophisticated measures for attempting to examine
auditioning and promotion effects for other courts. See, e.g., Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Courting the President: How Circuit Court Judges Alter Their Behavior for Promotion
to the Supreme Court, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 30 (2016); Stephen J. Choi et al., The Role of
Competence in Promotions from the Lower Federal Courts, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. S107 (2015).
The measure here is much less inclusive and, as a result, surely undercounts those MJs attempting to audition for a district court appointment (if such an effect exists). This has the
effect of dampening any MJ auditioning results that may exist.
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(N=777) while future-elevated MJs have a probability of granting these motions of 0.81 (N=53). This difference of 0.11 is significant at the p < 0.10 level.
The difference is consistent across the identity of the movant, with defendantbrought motions having a 0.13 higher probability of being granted by future
DJs and plaintiff-brought motions having a 0.10 higher probability of being
granted by future DJs.
TABLE 16: CASE OUTCOMES AND ACTIVITY: MAGISTRATE JUDGES WHO DO AND DO NOT
RECEIVE FUTURE ARTICLE III APPOINTMENTS76

Case Settles (Outcome)
Plaintiff Wins (Outcome)
Defendant Wins (Outcome)
Time to Case Resolution
Rate of Appeal
Rate of Reversal (in
whole or part) on Appeal

Non-elevated
Magistrate
Judges
0.71
(N=147)
0.06
(N=13)
0.23
(N=47)
478 days
(N=211)
0.13 (N=211)

Future Elevated
Magistrate
Judges

Difference

0.63 (N=40)

[NS]

0.06 (N=4)

[NS]

0.30 (N=19)

[NS]

0.11 (N=27)

0.25 (N=4)

517 days
(N=63)
0.06 (N=63)

[NS]
-0.06**
[NS]

In the Boyd data, the larger number of observations allows a bit more analysis, although few differences emerge. These details are provided in Table 16.
As we can see, for the case outcome—settled, plaintiff wins, or defendant
wins—there are no statistically significant differences between the two types of
MJs. The same is true for the number of days to case resolution.
Indeed, the only area of statistically meaningful difference between MJs
who do and do not receive future district court appointments in the Boyd data is
the rate of appeal. And this variable behaves exactly how we would expect
from an auditioning effect. The cases assigned to MJs who do receive future
district court appointments are 6 percent less likely to be appealed than those
assigned to other MJs. This result holds even though the rate of case settlement
is slightly lower (although not statistically lower) for these future DJs.
Finally, the Boyd data provide some (albeit limited) insight into R&Rs and
the possible MJ-auditioning effect.77 Within the Boyd data, there are only eight
of 344 R&Rs written by future DJs. These eight MJs who will eventually re76

“**” designates that the difference is statistically significant at the p < 0.10 level, onetailed.
77 While opinion content is very relevant here, of the seventy-five opinions written by MJs
in the Boyd data, only two were written by a future-elevated MJ. Both of these opinions
happen to be opinions authored by Judge Jarvey from the Northern District of Iowa.
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ceive DJ appointments never have their R&Rs not adopted while other MJs
have a non-adoption rate of nineteen out of 335, or 6 percent. The number of
future-elevated MJs is too low here to tell us if this difference is statistically
meaningful, but as very early evidence, it is certainly informative, and points
toward an auditioning effect.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION: WITH ALL NECESSARY CAUTION
Recall the three empirical questions of interest to this project:




Do MJs produce distinct outputs from DJs?
Do DJs with and without MJ experience behave differently from one
another?
Do MJs who receive future DJ appointments produce distinct outputs
from other MJs?

Let us briefly summarize the findings for each. For each question, there are
numerous areas where there is no statistical difference between the two types of
judges examined. However, for each, there are some notable areas of distinction. For question one (differences between MJs and DJs), this includes grant
rates of discovery motions, the likelihood of cases settling, the appeal rate, the
number of days to case resolution, the number of docket entries before case
resolution, and the likelihood of opinion publication. For question two, differences in settlement probabilities again emerge (along with closely entangled
rates of appeals and relief obtained). The data also show a lower rate of R&R
non-adoption and a higher number of words and citations per opinion among
MJ-experienced DJs than those DJs without that same experience. Finally, for
question three, the data reveal that MJs who receive future DJ appointments
have a higher grant rate on discovery motions and a lower rate of appeal than
their MJ colleagues. There are also no instances in the data of future-DJ MJs
who do not have their R&Rs adopted by their supervising DJ.
Of course, as outlined in Part I of the paper and restated at various points
throughout the empirical sections, these results must be interpreted with caution. This includes that the small sample sizes of MJs throughout much of this
project provide a number of limitations. When the sample sizes are as low as
they are in some places here, it is just as likely that any effect or lack of effect
that is observed is due to the behavior of one judge or the norms of a district
court rather than some systematic pattern due to the judge’s categorization as a
DJ, MJ, future DJ, or previous MJ. As an analogy, scholars studying the behavior of female justices on the U.S. Supreme Court have long faced this complication; prior to 1993, that study was simply a study of Justice O’Connor.78 Interesting, but hard to generalize. And even since then, the presence of only four
female justices over time is very limiting, particularly when one considers additional confounding factors.
78

See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986).
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Because of the preliminary nature of scholarship examining MJs, empirical
and otherwise, exploratory or mining data exercises like this can serve an important role in advancing our understanding of the topic. But the statistics and
inferences are not causal. I have estimated no multivariate regression models
and controlled for no extraneous variables. Because of a lack of consistent random assignment of cases and matters to MJs, this project cannot distinguish between behavioral differences and underlying case differences when it comes to
interpreting the descriptive statistics comparing MJ and DJ outputs. The issue
areas studied in the EEOC and Boyd data also do not represent all types of civil
cases that MJs work in, and, of course, the data do not cover criminal matters at
all. Generalizability concerns stemming from the data are likely to be particularly possible with the EEOC data given the very unique filtering process used
by the EEOC in bringing litigation, the high probability of settlement, and the
consistencies present in the cases and the types of parties litigating them.
MJs are a vital part of district court litigation. In the EEOC data alone, approximately 67 percent of the cases have at least one MJ participating. Nearly
half of the status, management, and scheduling conferences are held by MJs,
meaning that for the parties involved in the cases, the MJ can play an important
role in shaping the litigation and the interactions that take place. While MJs and
DJs share some case activities (especially when MJs are the consent judge), the
data indicate a very complementary relationship. MJs preside over the vast majority of settlement conferences (562 vs. 120; 82 percent) and hear more substantive discovery motions than DJs (1138 vs. 897; 56 percent). Both of these
activity statistics connect to settlement likelihoods and timing during litigation.
The theme of settlement strengths is, of course, repeated for DJs who have MJ
experience.79
Moving forward with the MJ momentum and insights generated at this
Symposium, we (collectively, as scholars) will hopefully be in a position to collect more data and move toward future empirical analyses that can provide systematic, inferential tests of some of the questions pondered here. Only at that
stage can we truly make informed assessments of whether MJs behave differently from DJs and whether those differences, if present, extend to other areas.

79

These data seem to reflect bits and pieces of the three organizational models for MJs described by Seron: (1) “[m]agistrate as additional judge,” (2) “[m]agistrate as specialist,” and
(3) “[m]agistrate as team player.” Carroll Seron, Magistrates and the Work of Federal
Courts: A New Division of Labor, 69 JUDICATURE 353, 356–57 (1986).

